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ABSTRACT: Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous 
necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended 
by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order 
contingentism (the negation of necessitism about individuals) and higher-order necessitism; a combination 
that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including 
some replies to Williamson’s additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pre-
theoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all orders (which Williamson mainly de-
fends by invoking considerations of simplicity). 
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RESUMEN: Según el necesitismo sobre los individuos, necesariamente todo individuo necesariamente existe. Una te-
sis necesitista análoga atribuye existencia necesaria a propiedades y relaciones. Ambas tesis han sido defen-
didas por Williamson. Además, Williamson argumenta específicamente contra la conjunción híbrida de 
contingentismo de primer orden (la negación del necesitismo sobre los individuos) combinado con necesi-
tismo de orden superior; una combinación que acarrearía problemas adicionales. En este artículo desarrollo 
una defensa de esa combinación híbrida, incluyendo algunas réplicas a tales objeciones adicionales de Wi-
lliamson. Consideraciones de parsimonia ontológica e intuiciones pre-teóricas favorecen la concepción hí-
brida frente al necesitismo en todos los órdenes (defendido por Williamson basándose, principalmente, en 
consideraciones de simplicidad). 
Palabras clave: Williamson; parsimonia ontológica; intuiciones pre-teóricas; Fórmula Barcan; simplicidad; semántica de 
mundos posibles; lógica modal; contingentismo; necesitismo. 
1. Introduction 
A certain metaphysical modal thesis establishes that necessarily every individual necessarily 
exists. Let’s call this claim necessitism about individuals, or first-order necessitism. An analo-
gous necessitist thesis would attribute necessary existence to second order entities, 
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properties of individuals and relations between individuals. If—for the sake of sim-
plicity—we restrict our concern (regarding second-order entities) to properties (as I 
will do in this paper), necessitism about properties (second-order necessitism) says that neces-
sarily every property necessarily exists. The negation of necessitism can be named contin-
gentism. So, there is a contingentist view about individuals and a contingentist view 
about properties. In fact, the contingentism/necessitism dispute is reproduced at eve-
ry level (for higher-order properties and relations as well). 
 The terminology is borrowed from Timothy Williamson’s work, where we find a 
vigorous and thorough defence of necessitism at all orders (cf. Williamson 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2010, 2013). He has offered—in my view—the most powerful arguments we 
can find in the literature for each of the two main theses: first-order necessitism and 
higher-order necessitism (necessitism about properties and relations of any order). 
Furthermore, Williamson also argues specifically against the conjunction of first-order 
contingentism and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about 
additional drawbacks (cf. Williamson 2013, ch. 6). My main aim in this article is to de-
fend such a combination (contingentism about individuals and higher-order neces-
sitism). Before doing so, I will briefly sketch the main pieces of evidence provided by 
Williamson against first-order contingentism, as well as my responses (Sections 3 and 
4). Then Williamson’s evidence for higher-order necessitism is described (Section 5); 
here I tentatively accept his view on this, so that my preferred position is to endorse 
higher-order necessitism but to reject necessitism about individuals. Williamson’s criti-
cisms to this conjunction and my responses to his worries are laid out in Sections 6 
and 7.  Before all this, in the next section, I devote some space to introducing the de-
bate, including a few remarks about how the contingentism/necessitism dispute con-
nects with (different versions of) the Barcan Formula, and a first appraisal of what our 
pre-theoretical intuitive judgments about these issues are. As we progress through the 
paper it will become clear that we find in Williamson’s texts what can be appropriately 
described as new, completely original evidence for a very old metaphysical hypothesis 
that I will call modal metaphysical atomism, as presented in the final section: Section 7. 
2. Barcan Formulas and necessitism 
First of all, let me offer formal versions of the main necessitist theses which I am go-
ing to discuss here. In the absence of specific predicates for existence, first-order ne-
cessitism and second-order necessitism (restricted to monadic properties) can be for-
malized, respectively, as Nec1 and Nec2: 
(Nec1) □∀x □∃y (x = y)    
(Nec2) □∀X □∃Y (X = Y) 
 I will use ‘Nec1’ to refer indifferently to both the metaphysical claim (necessitism 
about individuals) and to this formal version of it, since the discussion will not depend 
on subtleties regarding how well the former is captured by the latter. Likewise with re-
spect to ‘Nec2’. 
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 From Nec1, each instance of the Barcan Formula follows. Probably the most 
common version of the Barcan Formula is BF1: 
(BF1)  ◊ ∃x F(x) → ∃x ◊ F(x) 1   
 BF1 says that if there can be an individual x that is F, then there is an individual x 
that is F. In terms of possible worlds, it establishes (assuming some other simplifica-
tions that I will not question here) that each possible individual (the inhabitant of any 
possible world) exists in the actual world. This is a clear consequence of Nec1, be-
cause Nec1 entails that all possible worlds have the same domain.2 
 For second-order, we have the following version of the Barcan Formula: 
(BF2)  ◊ ∃X A(X) → ∃X ◊ A(X)      
 It establishes that if there can be a property X that is A, then there is a property X 
that is A. BF2 is a logical consequence of Nec2, just as BF1 is a logical consequence 
of Nec1. 
 In his brilliant and detailed exposition of the subject, Williamson recommends as 
the best option for the defender of BF1 that it be accommodated within a general 
conception where Nec1 also holds (even if BF1 is compatible with the negation of 
Nec1). The same recommendation ensues with respect to BF2 vis-à-vis Nec2. I am very 
sympathetic to a great deal of Williamson’s terminological and methodological consid-
erations and suggestions. That includes his relatively common treatment of Nec1 and 
BF1 (and his similar treatment of Nec2 and BF2). As far as I am concerned, I also 
treat Nec1 and BF1 in this shared manner; my objections against them apply equally 
to both. In the same way, I will accept (for the reasons Williamson provides; cf. Sec-
tion 5 below) not only BF2 but also Nec2. 
 Now, it is time to start our evaluation of Nec1 and BF1. There is a strong prima 
facie objection to BF1 (which therefore also counts against Nec1). Depending on how 
that objection is confronted, a second objection may emerge too. The first objection is 
that some instances of the formula are pre-theoretically very counterintuitive. We may 
invoke one of the most common examples, sentence (1): 
(1) ◊ ∃x (Wittgenstein fathered x) → ∃x ◊ (Wittgenstein fathered x)  
 Leaving aside radical scepticism about modality, we can easily accept the truth of 
the antecedent of (1). From BF1 and the antecedent of (1), we can derive its conse-
quent. But, as a matter of fact, Wittgenstein had no children. So, if BF1 is valid, some 
actual entity that is not a child of Wittgenstein could have been a child of Wittgen-
stein. In my view, this result contradicts some very firmly rooted intuitions about on-
tology and modality. No human being (child of other parents) seems to be a candidate 
                                                      
1 The formula has had this name, since the mid 1950s, because Ruth Barcan Marcus had proposed an al-
most identical formula in the previous decade, in her pioneering writings on quantified modal logic. 
She later defended the formula proposing a substitutional reading of the quantifiers, different from 
the standard objectual reading that I will assume in this work (cf. Marcus 1962). An evaluation of her 
substitutional theory of quantification would deviate us from the main purpose in this article. 
2  I will not deal with issues about accessibility relations between possible worlds. For the sake of simplicity, 
I will treat all possible worlds as accessible to each other. 
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entity. Nor does any other kind of living being, let alone some other individual be-
longing to one of the ontological categories we are familiar with (rocks, tables, planets, 
electrons, numbers, etc.). 
 The defender of BF1 has two main options. She may defy these intuitions and 
propose that one of those familiar entities (a living being, or an artefact, or another 
kind of physical object, or an abstract entity) could have been a child of Wittgenstein 
(even if it actually is not). A more promising strategy (followed by Williamson and 
some other philosophers) is to postulate a new ontological category of entities that 
was unknown until now. For Williamson, such would-be children of Wittgenstein are 
possibly concrete entities: non-concrete entities which, unlike abstract entities, could be 
concrete (that is, in some other possible worlds they are concrete). (Williamson’s onto-
logical theory is close to that of Linsky and Zalta 1994.) The pre-theoretical intuition 
that is violated by this strategy is not exactly that none of these entities (non-concrete but 
possibly concrete entities) could be a child of Wittgenstein, but that there are no such en-
tities. Of course, abstract theoretical inquiry may require us to postulate their exist-
ence; but right now I am describing some of our pre-theoretical intellectual seemings; 
and they include the prima facie rejection of non-concrete but possibly concrete enti-
ties. 
 A second objection can be raised against the strategy followed by Williamson: con-
siderations of ontological parsimony speak against it. And they do so in two senses: 
the strategy proposes the actual existence of a lot of new things (things we did not 
think existed); and it also proposes the actual existence of a new ontological category 
of beings (non-concrete but possibly concrete beings). 
 As far as I can see, nothing in Williamson’s view prevents him from admitting such 
prima facie double evidence against BF1 (it goes against first intuitions; and when 
supported by the postulation of new entities, it is ontologically uneconomical). On the 
contrary, we can find claims such as: “Any philosophical assessment of BF [...] must 
start by acknowledging that there seem to be compelling counterexamples to [it]” 
(Williamson 2010, Section 1). But pre-theoretical intuitions and very general criteria of 
ontological parsimony are far from being enough to settle metaphysical issues such as 
this. I completely agree with Williamson that theoretical inquiry is needed if we are to 
reach a wiser view: “Only theoretical inquiry can properly address the question” (Wil-
liamson 2013, ch. 1). So let us have a look, in the following sections, at what theoreti-
cal inquiry could be invoked to counter such double evidence against Williamson’s de-
fence of Nec1. 
3. The evidence against first-order contingentism: philosophical interpretations of possible worlds     
semantics 
For reasons of space, I will confine myself to what I take to be the two most promi-
nent arguments for BF1 found in Williamson’s works. The discussion of the first, in 
this section, will be just a brief and very schematic sketch of the issue (as anything 
more detailed would require much more attention; I discuss it extensively in Pérez 
Otero 2009, 2010). It concerns the philosophical interpretation of possible worlds se-
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mantics. The second argument addresses questions of simplicity in our election of a 
logic theory, and I will deal with it in the next section. 
 We must, first, restrict ourselves to those models of possible worlds semantics 
(PWS, henceforth) that could be considered as intended models. The existence of coun-
ter-models to BF1 in PWS is irrelevant to the contingentism/necessitism dispute, 
which concerns the intended interpretation of instances of BF1 (I agree with William-
son on this). Now, according to Williamson, PWS must be taken at face value, in a re-
alist sprit. He thinks that such a realist stance involves reading PWS as a full, complete 
theory of meaning of our modal natural languages. That, in its turn, would commit us 
as to accepting, as the best philosophical conception of modality within which to ac-
commodate PWS, one in which the domain of the actual world must be identified 
with the domain of what in PWS is sometimes called “the actual world” of any of the 
intended models taken as realist models of our natural language. (Williamson would 
say that there is just one intended model.)  
 According to some views opposed by Williamson, such “actual worlds” of models 
of PWS—we can call them @, as it is usual—are just representational set-theoretic en-
tities. Their domain—their defenders would say—is not identical to the domain of the 
actual world. If we identify @’s domain with the domain of the actual world, then (I 
think Williamson is right on this) each instance of BF1 is true, since any individual be-
longing to the domain of a possible world w, but supposedly not in @’s domain (a 
would-be child of Wittgenstein, for instance), must be quantified over when we for-
mulate—in the meta-language—the semantics clauses of PWS. So, any of those indi-
viduals must exist, i.e. must belong to the domain of the actual world. If such a do-
main coincides with @’s domain, then @ also contains the individual. (Cf. Williamson 
1998; 2013, ch. 3 and 4.) 
 Williamson is well aware of the alternative I have mentioned (that the actual world 
and @ do not have the same domain). He alludes to it:  
The domain D(@) of the actual world @ of such a structure would somehow represent or go 
proxy for everything without containing everything, thereby leaving some objects over to belong 
to the domains only of other worlds and thereby falsify some instances of BF1, if required. (Wil-
liamson 2013, section 3.6. I have made some very minor terminological adjustments.) 
However, he rules out this view as instrumentalist and thereby incompatible with the 
realist perspective we should adopt towards PWS; a realist perspective that—he 
thinks—requires us to take PWS as a complete theory of meaning of modal sentences. 
Some traits of the meaning of some sentences (for instance, its de re character, the sin-
gular representational content) would not be appropriately captured if the intended 
models, the “actual world”, @, in them and the individuals in @’s domain are merely 
representational artefacts.  
 What Williamson calls an “instrumentalist” interpretation of PWS is—I think—the 
right view.3 A contingentist is not committed to accepting (Williamson’s work proba-
                                                      
3  The point at stake does not depend on whether the alternative criticized by Williamson deserves the tag 
‘instrumentalism’ or not. But I reject the tag (although most of Williamson’s terminological decisions 
seem accurate to me). The alternative I propose is a realist view of strict PWS, even if it may be con-
sidered a non-realistic conception of possible worlds and their “inhabitants” under the philosophical 
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bly shows that she should not accept) that PWS is the (full, complete) semantic theory 
for modal natural languages. The function of models (in PWS) is not to model all 
traits that are relevant to the semantics. I conceive of PWS as an important part, but 
only a proper part, of a completely appropriate semantic theory of meaning for modal 
natural languages. For instance, it may in particular be demanding too much of PWS 
to require that it accounts for the fact that sentences containing the name ‘Socrates’ 
(in use) concern, de re, Socrates. What determines facts such as this are the kind of 
factors which also determine which models should count as intended models and these 
factors are external to strict PWS: they would be part of the conceptual foundations of 
PWS (as I have called them elsewhere; cf. Pérez Otero 2010). 
 To put it in Williamson’s own words: 
Of course, we can endow a model with a rich actuality-involving representational significance 
from outside, for instance by explaining independently of the model how to read the non-logical 
atomic expressions of the language. But that is to relegate the model to a largely instrumental 
role. It merely determines which sentences are represented as true; what they mean is determined 
elsewhere. (Williamson 2013, section 4.9) 
 I endorse with some qualifications this strategy (committed with the idea of enrich-
ing the model “from outside”) that Williamson rejects. The dichotomy telling-which-
sentences-are-true/telling-what-they-mean is potentially misleading. PWS captures part 
of what sentences mean. And PWS’s apparatus allows us to formulate (even if PWS by 
itself does not decide) some other traits of meaning in a precise way. For instance, re-
garding “singular” representational content: the intuition that sentences containing the 
name ‘Socrates’ concern, de re, the singular thing Socrates is partially captured by the 
requirement that proper names have the same denotation in all possible worlds (in any 
“intended” model). I recognize that the de re intuition goes beyond that. But PWS 
was originally conceived mainly as a logic theory, and this is also the case in the context 
of Williamson’s texts. It is plausible to sustain that the remaining part of the intuition 
goes beyond the scope of modal logic.4 
4. The evidence against first-order contingentism: criteria of simplicity 
Let us now consider the other prominent argument for BF1 in Williamson’s work, 
which concerns the criteria of simplicity in the election of a logic theory. Williamson 
describes the costs of renouncing to Nec1 in our preferred logic theory. In a nutshell, 
the cost that contingentists have to pay for denying Nec1 is to “either adopt free logic 
even for the non-modal fragment of their language or restrict necessitation (perhaps 
both)” (Williamson 2013, Section 2.2). Systems of free logic are mainly motivated by 
                                                                                                                                         
presupposition that “possible worlds” should be understood, by default, in some ultra-realist way, 
close to Lewis’ or to Williamson’s own view about such “inhabitants”. PWS cannot be identified with 
any particular philosophical theory of “possible worlds”. Cf. Section 4 of my Pérez Otero 2010, spe-
cially note 8. 
4 I fully develop this contingentist interpretation of PWS in Pérez Otero (2009, 2010). Some of the main 
key ideas come from Pérez Otero (1996, 1999). Related views can be found in Menzel (1990), Rosen 
(1990) and Chihara (1998). For some recent statements on the theoretical main point of PWS by one 
of its founders, cf. the Concluding Unscientific Postscript in Kripke (2011, 377-378). 
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the admission of singular terms that may not have a referent. In such systems, some of 
the usual rules of derivation are restricted; for instance, we cannot derive ∃x F(x) from 
F(c). The other alternative is to renounce to the rule of necessitation; which establish-
es that if A is a theorem, then so too is □A. 
 Both options have a negative consequence, highlighted by Williamson: the logical 
complexity is increased; there is a significant loss of simplicity. I am going to assume 
that accepting free logic (rather than dropping necessitation) is the best choice for the 
contingentist. Williamson presents a detailed enumeration of the problems encoun-
tered by free logic, related to the fact that it would be less simple than classical, un-
free logic. “In practice, the axiomatizations of such ‘free’ modal logics are often quite 
complicated” (Williamson 2013, ch. 2, note 11); “whether or not contingentists retain 
the rule of necessitation, their system overall has aspects of a free modal logic. This is 
an early indication that contingentism has costs in logical complexity” (ch. 2, p. 16).5 
 My reply to this criticism is dual: it combines some moderate scepticism (or agnos-
ticism) about the alleged fact that free logic is objectively more complex than classical 
un-free logic with minimizing in a certain way the relevance of such a difference in 
simplicity. 
 How objective (mind-independent, not related to human capacities) would the 
supposed fact that free logic is more complex than classical logic be? A Spanish driver 
could innocently say “Driving on the right is more simple, less complicated, than driv-
ing on the left”. The little truth there is in her assertion would be close to this: she is 
used to driving on the right, and—as a consequence—driving on the left would now 
be more complicated for her than driving on the right. At the other end of the spec-
trum, we probably think that addition is more simple than quaddition, in a much more 
objective sense of ‘simplicity’.6 It seems plausible that any rational being (not only any 
human being) would “feel” and think (if equipped with cognitive capacities to repre-
sent and understand the issue) that addition is more simple than quaddition. If classi-
cal logic were more simple than free logic in some similar sense (and degree) to the 
way in which addition is more simple than quaddition that would constitute very 
strong evidence against free logic. But, where in that broad spectrum (with the case of 
the driver at one end and addition/quaddition at the other) is the case of free/classical 
logic located? How complex or complicated would it be (or would it be for us) to en-
gage in systems of free logic? Someone can say that there is a very clear sense in which 
free logic is more complex than classical logic: the axioms and/or inference rules and 
the derivations are more complex. But the question remains: how objective is such 
greater complexity? 
                                                      
5 Similar considerations of simplicity also appear in later chapters. For instance, with regards to the dis-
cussion of our previous section, we find: “Although contingentists can tell some sort of representa-
tional story to connect the model theory with the intended modal interpretation, their story is too in-
direct to make the model theory much more than a complicated digression. By contrast, necessitists 
can connect the model theory to the intended interpretation directly” (Williamson 2013, section 3.6). 
6 Quaddition can be defined as follows: for any natural numbers, n, m, if n or m is greater than the greater 
number that has never been added, then n quus m is 7; otherwise, n quus m is the same as n plus m. 
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 Most of us with some explicit knowledge of logic have learned classical un-free 
logic, and have little or no expertise in free logic. Some of the complications of free 
logic will stem from this (maybe almost universal but nonetheless) biographical fact. 
Williamson’s case cannot depend solely on that complexity (stemmed from facts 
about what we learn first). Maybe (I do not know if there is a known answer to this) 
free logic is objectively more complex for any human being, due to traits of human 
cognitive architecture which nonetheless cannot be extrapolated to all possible rational 
thinkers. If that were so, it would favour Williamson’s case; although not very much. 
The central concept of logic is the concept of logical consequence. This notion is ab-
stracted from the notion of rational argumentation; rational argumentation alone; 
which is not necessarily restricted to possible contingencies linked to human rational 
argumentation (even though, of course, the paradigmatic known cases of rational ar-
gumentation involve human beings). 
 On the other hand, simplicity is just one of the criteria that are to be taken in con-
sideration; it cannot be as decisive as Williamson’s claims seem to suggest. (Obviously, 
the scepticism expressed in the previous paragraphs also contributes to minimizing 
the importance that we should attach to a parameter that is so difficult to determine.) 
It is just one factor to be considered.  
 There is an additional, ad hominem, reason to resist the appeal to simplicity. It seems 
to me that considerations of simplicity (in the context of addressing the question: 
What is the right logic?) would have more strength if the underlying philosophical 
conception of logic were more classical, less realist than the conception defended by 
Williamson. I would say that the more objective (about the world itself; mind-
independent) a discipline is (or the subject matter of that discipline is), the less weight 
considerations of simplicity have. (I am not claiming that in the most objective theo-
retical disciplines simplicity is of no importance; in fact, I reject that claim.) But, pre-
cisely, Williamson has worked out a view according to which logic is seen as a theory 
of very general traits of the world, close to the idea of logic as ultra-physics or ultra-
metaphysics, or even not clearly different from general metaphysics. (Cf., for instance, 
Section 3.7 of Williamson 2013.) In this respect, given such an objectivist view of log-
ic, simplicity counts for even less than what it would in more classical (conceptual, or 
analytical) views of the nature of logic. 
 The conclusion I want to extract from the discussion in this and the preceding sec-
tion is that the strong double evidence against BF1 (based on pre-theoretical intuitions 
and ontological parsimony) is not overridden by the evidence invoked by Williamson 
in his defence of Nec1. Adopting free logic (which has received independent support 
in the literature, unrelated to any ad hoc move aimed at saving our contingentist intui-
tions) seems to be less revisionist than postulating Williamson’s non-concrete but pos-
sibly concrete entities. 
5. Higher-order necessitism 
In this section, I maintain that the evidence we could have against Nec2, necessitism 
about properties, is weaker by far than the evidence we have against Nec1, necessitism 
about individuals, described in Section 2. Relevant data favouring Nec2 could, there-
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fore, be decisive in tipping the balance. In my view, the evidence for Nec2 provided 
by Williamson (2010; 2013, ch. 6) seems to be decisive enough. I am inclined to accept 
that necessarily every property necessarily exists. 
 As Williamson explicitly proposes, the properties we are talking about in a formula 
like Nec2 
(Nec2) □∀X □∃Y (X = Y) 
have to be properties in a very broad sense of the concept property. They are the ap-
propriate values that second-order variables in our language can take (cf. Williamson 
2013, ch. 5). So, to a certain extent, they are, more similar to set-like entities than—for 
instance—to entities with the ontological weight that many philosophers attribute to 
universals conceived as ultimately being responsible for the causal powers of things.7 
 It is important to be aware that (in the context of the discussion in this paper) the 
debate about existence or non-existence of some alleged properties—the debate about 
whether Nec2 is true or false—is concerned with this broad sense of properties. Hav-
ing such a broad sense in mind, it is not so hard to accept the ontological proliferation 
of entities derived from Nec2. For example, a classical point that is disputed is the sta-
tus of non-instantiated properties. Some philosophers claim that having instances is a 
necessary requirement for a property to exist. Properties that are conceived of with 
that requirement are sometimes called immanent. According to this view, there could be 
some properties that actually do not exist: properties instantiated in other possible 
worlds but without instances in the actual world. If properties are appropriate values 
for second-order variables, then we must accept the existence of properties corre-
sponding to predicates such as: x is a human who measures more than 1,5 metres tall but less 
than 1,9 metres. (Some other views on properties could sustain that this is too specific, 
or too conjunctive, or not natural enough, or not basic enough, to be a property.) 
Now, let r and q be rational numbers greater than 1,5 but smaller that 1,9 such that the 
alleged property F, corresponding to the predicate x is a human who measures more than r 
metres tall but less than q metres, has no actual instances. It is very natural to think that F 
is instantiated in other possible worlds and it is just by luck that it lacks instances in 
the actual world. A philosopher who thinks that properties are immanent (they only 
exist if instantiated) and accepts the existence of millions of properties corresponding 
to predicates of the form x is a human who measures more than n metres tall but less than m 
metres should nevertheless reject the actual existence of property F. I do not think that 
our pre-theoretical intuitions clearly favour this immanentist philosopher. But this is a 
typical case that could be adduced to oppose Nec2; a case based on the idea that 
properties only exist in possible worlds where they are instantiated.  
 In general, I do not think that we have strong pre-theoretical intuitions for or 
against Nec2. If my impression is right, then an important source of evidence for con-
tingentism about individuals is completely (or almost completely) absent in the parallel 
                                                      
7 I am sympathetic myself to such an ontologically weighty view about universals (cf. ch. 4 of Pérez Otero 
1999). I just say that this sense of property is not exactly the sense which is relevant when evaluating 
Nec2, especially with regards to Williamson’s data for Nec2 that I am going to mention. 
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case regarding contingentism about properties. Therefore, on issues regarding the on-
tological status of properties, theoretical inquiry has to play a more important role. 
 The other source of evidence for contingentism about individuals invoked in Sec-
tion 2 was ontological parsimony. If Nec1 was accompanied by the postulation of a 
new category of beings (such as Williamson’s non-concrete but possibly concrete enti-
ties), then the result was uneconomical, in two ways: it proposes the actual existence 
of a lot of new things (things we did not think existed); and worse, it also proposes the 
actual existence of a new ontological category. Nec2 would only violate ontological 
parsimony in the first sense, if at all. If the opposition to Nec2 comes with a commit-
ment to an immanentist view of properties, then Nec2 certainly involves the existence 
of a lot of new properties, such as F, but each of which belongs to the same kind as 
some old ones postulated by second-order contingentism (F, for example, is very simi-
lar to the properties—accepted by the immanentist—corresponding to predicates with 
the form of x is a human who measures more than n metres tall but less than m metres). If Nec2 
is rejected on different grounds (that are compatible with non-immanent properties), 
we should wait and see what the other motivation is, in order to appraise what the on-
tological cost of Nec2 amounts to.  
 Now, let us have a quick look at the arguments employed by Williamson to defend 
Nec2. The basic idea is the following. There are some important desiderata related to 
the expressive capacities of higher-order languages that can only be satisfied if Nec2 is 
true (they require, in fact, the truth of general higher-order necessitism, from which 
Nec2 follows). For instance, one of the desiderata is the need (in set theory) to avail 
ourselves of principles of comprehension such as (this is a version restricted to mo-
nadic second-order variables): ∃X □∀x (X(x) ↔ A(X)).      
 Williamson examines with detail and criticizes the options open to the higher-order 
contingentist to meet such desiderata without Nec2 (cf. Williamson 2010; 2013, Sec-
tions 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4). Here I cannot go into the discussion of these issues, as that 
would be a matter for another entire paper, at least. As I advanced above, I tend to 
accept Williamson’s position on this particular question. His argument seems to me 
strong enough to override the previous evidence we had for higher-order contin-
gentism (as far as I can see what that previous evidence may be). I think that any for-
mer agnostic view about Nec2 (or even a view slightly inclined against Nec2) should 
be revised to (more or less confident) acceptance of Nec2 in the light of the evidence 
provided by Williamson. 
 My preferred position about the contingentism/necessitism debate is, therefore, to 
reject necessitism about individuals (Nec1) and to tentatively accept higher-order ne-
cessitism, of which necessitism about properties (Nec2) is a particular case.  
6. Minimalist first-order contingentism             
Williamson argues against the hybrid view (Nec2 without Nec1) independently of his 
other objections to Nec1. He offers an argument aimed to show that there is an im-
portant problem in the heterogeneity postulated by the hybrid view. Let us say that the 
haecceity of an individual, y, is the property of being necessarily identical to y, in the 
sense predicated of X in the formula: □∀x (Xx ↔ x = y) (so, ‘X is a haecceity of y’ is 
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another way to express this formula). Now, once we grant Nec2, we must accept the 
necessary existence of haecceities of any possible individual. All possible worlds con-
tain the same properties, and—in particular—the same haecceities. Even if y does not 
exist in possible world w, the property corresponding to ‘X is a haecceity of y’ exists in 
w. For instance, the property of being Socrates would also exist in worlds where—for 
first-order contingentists—Socrates does not exist. The problem is that haecceities are 
relational properties that seem to be metaphysically dependent on the corresponding 
individuals. The haecceity of y seems to involve metaphysically y. It would seem that y 
is a constituent of the property. But how then can the property exist if (according to 
contingentism about individuals) y does not exist? (Cf. Williamson 2013, section 6.2.) 
 Several answers to the problem are examined and criticized by Williamson. In my 
view, some versions of two of them have good prospects for being deemed reasona-
ble replies to the objection.  
 The first one is based on an answer Williamson classifies as minimalist. The idea—
as I would have it—is to reject the question as a pseudo-problem, or to reject it simply 
because it depends on the false assumption that haecceities are metaphysically de-
pendent on singular entities (maybe these are two different answers). Here, once again, 
it is relevant the fact that when speaking of “properties” we are talking about appro-
priate values of second-order variables. The impression that the haecceity of y 
(□∀x (Xx ↔ x = y)) metaphysically depends on y would be probably more pressing if 
we assumed a more substantive view about the nature of properties. The minimalist 
answer says, in Williamson’s own terms: “we need no more explanation of how my 
haecceity singles me out in my absence than that it is the property that, necessarily, 
applies to something if it is me and not otherwise” (Williamson 2013, section 6.2). 
 In reply, he writes:  
One danger for minimalist contingentism is that the minimalism leaves the contingentism looking 
suspiciously ad hoc [...] The onus is on the metaphysician who postulates such logical differences 
between orders to justify the asymmetry in treatment. Minimalism deprives the contingentist of 
the resources needed to provide a satisfying justification. [...] The default preference is for a uni-
form metaphysics, on which being is contingent at all orders or none. (Williamson 2013, sec. 6.2) 
 This objection has some force, but I do not think that it goes too far. Individuals 
and properties (of any order) are ontologically as different as two kinds of entities can 
be. It should not be surprising that they mark a difference with respect to the contin-
gentism/necessitism issue. It is far from clear that the default preference—in this re-
spect—is for a uniform metaphysics.8 
 
 
 
                                                      
8 It is fair to say that Williamson takes this kind of counter-reply on the part of the minimalist contin-
gentist into consideration. He claims “even if we grant that metaphysical difference for the sake of 
argument, [...] it does not really explain the non-contingency of higher-order being” (Sec. 6.2). As I 
understand the minimalist stance, there would be no need for such an explanation. What Williamson 
wants to see explained would be a consequence of the conceptually basic difference between individ-
uals and “properties”. 
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7. Modal metaphysical atomism  
The second answer to the problem that I find sensible is a relational strategy, which 
naturally leads us to a certain atomist metaphysical hypothesis. Even if a certain knife, 
k, does not exist in world w, we can account for the existence of its haecceity in w if k 
is essentially uniquely related to some other things that exist in w. Natural candidates 
for those other things are certain parts of k, for instance its handle and its blade. If k 
can be essentially uniquely characterized in terms of these and some other constitu-
ents,9 then the existence of these constituents would suffice for the existence of k’s 
haecceity, whether or not k exists. Of course, this relational strategy cannot stop at the 
handle and the blade of the knife. Contingentists about individuals will claim that 
handle and blade are contingent beings too. As Williamson clearly remarks: “To solve 
the problem by the relational strategy, the contingentist requires this for each individ-
ual i: necessarily, there are some individuals to which i is essentially uniquely related.” 
(Williamson 2013, section 6.2). The contingent knife k would have essential constitu-
ents (in terms of which it could be uniquely characterized and) that are necessary be-
ings. The same happens with any other contingent individual (Socrates, his birthday, 
the planets, etc.). Let us call such necessary constituents of the contingent individual z 
metaphysical atoms of z. The individuals typically conceived of as contingent by contin-
gentists are (events and) material objects. It is natural to think that if they have neces-
sary essential constituents, then those constituents are (basic events and) basic micro-
physical objects. Whatever their ultimate nature, the hypothesis is the following: nec-
essarily, for each individual z there are some individuals to which z is essentially 
uniquely related and that necessarily exist.10 I call this modal metaphysical atomism. We do 
not know whether modal metaphysical atomism is true or not. What we have found, 
however, is this: first-order contingentists who accept higher-order necessitism but are 
unhappy with the minimalist reply to the problem about haecceities posed by William-
son (and dislike any other response to it) may be inclined to accept modal metaphysi-
cal atomism. Granted the other assumptions, they may contemplate the need to solve 
that problem as indirect but non-negligible evidence for such a speculative metaphysi-
cal hypothesis. 
 Williamson presents four interrelated objections to modal metaphysical atomism 
(as conceived of in the context of the relational strategy to defend the hybrid view),  
(i) The microphysical basic constituents that physics can discern are unpromising 
candidates for necessary being by contingentist standards, because they could 
all have not existed. 
(ii)  There is no good independent evidence for the hypothesis that what tokens of 
ultimate particles there are is non-contingent. 
                                                      
9 Some events are probably to be included among the other constituents, not just objects. They would con-
tribute to fixing traits of the origin of the knife that are essential to it but which cannot be character-
ized solely in terms of objects. For a view about how events can be essential to living beings, cf. Sec-
tions III.4 and IV.1 of Pérez Otero (1999). 
10 This condition is trivially satisfied by necessary individuals (numbers, for instance, that contingentists 
can happily accept as non-contingent): they are essentially uniquely related to themselves. 
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(iii) The relational strategy is a huge concession to necessitism. 
(iv) The relational strategy, in postulating such necessary atoms, tends to under-
mine the motivation for being contingentist about other individuals: 
The natural starting-point for the contingentist’s rejection of the necessitist’s contingently non-
concrete objects is that they are mere postulates of abstract metaphysical speculation, with no 
basis in common sense or natural science. The relational strategy for saving haecceities [...] in-
volves just such speculation, and leads to postulating significantly more complicated metaphys-
ical structure beyond the reach of common sense or natural science than necessitism itself re-
quires. (Williamson 2013, section 6.2) 
 I have accepted point (ii). Among the many remarkable features of Williamson’s 
exposition in his 2013 book, is precisely that it offers elements that—under very dif-
ferent background assumptions from those of Williamson—could be seen as evidence 
for an old speculative hypothesis for which it is so difficult to gain evidence: modal 
metaphysical atomism. But we do not have any evidence for (i) either. There is no ra-
tionale for the contingentist about individuals to think that all basic microphysical enti-
ties must be contingent.11  
 That leads us to points (iii) and (iv). There is no unwanted concession to neces-
sitism if we adopt the relational strategy. (Of course, contingentism about individuals 
is not fuelled by some general prejudice against necessary objects.) The main motiva-
tion for the contingentist’s rejection of the necessitist’s contingently and temporarily 
non-concrete objects—at least as I conceive and defend the contingentist stance—is 
slightly misidentified in point (iv). Williamson is right in this much: metaphysical at-
oms are mere postulates of abstract metaphysical speculation, with no basis in com-
mon sense or natural science, just like his contingently and temporarily non-concrete objects. But 
contingentists reject Williamson’s ontology (contingently and temporarily non-
concrete objects) not because it has no basis in common sense (or natural science), 
but—to put it in a nutshell—because it goes against common sense (conflicting with 
pre-theoretical intuitions) and against ontological parsimony, and the evidence offered 
to override these prima-facie data (the extensive abstract theoretical inquiry developed 
by Williamson, or other authors) is deemed insufficient. In my view, the entities pos-
tulated by modal metaphysical atomism do not violate common sense at all; and their 
departure from ontological economy is not so radical.  
 As should be clear by now, modal metaphysical atomism is not the only way to 
save the hybrid view (contingentism about individuals combined with higher-order 
necessitism) from the problem about haecceities. Another option is the minimalist re-
sponse mentioned in the previous section. There are also the other responses exam-
ined and rejected by Williamson (which I have not presented here).  
 Let us assume, however, that modal metaphysical atomism is the best option for 
contingentists. In the end then, we have two main highly speculative alternative views 
on modal ontology. There existed Wittgenstein, for instance, that had no children. All 
                                                      
11 It is relevant to mention here the familiar Kripkean caveat about not conflating real (metaphysical) con-
tingency with mere epistemic contingency. Cf. Section IV.3 of my Pérez Otero (1999) for more on 
the necessary character of basic entities and laws of nature. 
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parts agree on that. Now, each option postulates new actual entities, related to Witt-
genstein in some ways, to account for certain facts:  
(a) Our actual world contains contingently non-concrete objects that can be children of 
Wittgenstein. They are concrete children of Wittgenstein only in some possi-
ble worlds. But they are necessary beings, existing in all possible worlds, just 
like Wittgenstein. 
(b) Our actual world contains metaphysical atoms of Wittgenstein. They are neces-
sary beings, existing in all possible worlds. So, they also exist in possible 
worlds where they are not arranged to constitute Wittgenstein (where, there-
fore, Wittgenstein doesn’t exist). In the same way, our actual world contains 
metaphysical atoms that in some other possible worlds are arranged to consti-
tute a certain child of Wittgenstein.  
 It is the impressive work of conceptual clarification and precision developed in 
Williamson’s texts on modal logic and metaphysics that have brought us to this di-
lemma between (a) and (b). I have suggested that the second horn is better supported 
by the overall evidence. 
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